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TORT LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
IN INDIANA
ALMA CHArIN*
Even at common law there seems to have been no time when municipal
corporations were entirely free from responsibility for torts,' and this lia-
bility has in most states now been extended or modified in varying degrees.
It is under this particular branch of the law that the demarcation between
governmental functions and private functions becomes most important sincejudicial decisions, in theory at least, generally predicate liability or immunity
upon this distinction. The Indiana court has repeatedly stated that munici-
pal corporations are not liable for negligence in discharging governmental
functions, 2 but are liable for negligence in the exercise of their private,
proprietary functions. 3 Thus stated, the rule is simple, but a great deal of
confusion arises when an attempt is made to determine in what capacity the
municipality was acting in committing the tort complained of. In the begin-
ning this peculiar doctrine of dual capacity of the municipality was prob-
ably useful as a means of evading the total immunity afforded by the theory
that the sovereign can do no wrong. The great increase in the functions
performed by the municipality and the changing policy of the state have ren-
dered the rule entirely unworkable.
On other occasions this court has stated that the municipality is not liable
for a tort committed in the performance of an act which is legislative or
discretionary in its nature, but that it is liable for torts committed in the
performance of an act ministerial in character. 4 An analysis of the Indiana
cases indicates the impracticability of the application of either rule, and. for
the most part the courts have adhered to such declarations only in theory.
A governmental act is usually defined as one which is performed not to
promote the private interests of the municipality, but as one performed for
public benefit. Thus, recognizing that the municipality acts in the interest
of the public in protecting the health of its citizens,5 in protecting property
* Of the Monroe County Bar.
1McQuillin, Vol. VI, Municipal Corporations, ch. 53, p. 741.
2 Indianapolis v. Williams (1814), 58 Ind. App. 447; Louisville Traction Co., v.
Jennings (1919), 73 Ind. App. 69; Union Traction Co. v. Muncie (1923), 80 Ind. Ap.
260.
3 Anderson v. East (1887), 117 Ind. 126; Aiken v. Columbus (1906), 167 Ind. 139.
4 Stackhouse v. Lafayette (1866), 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville (1867), 29
Ind. 187; Logansport v. Wright (1865), 25 Ind. 512; Wells v. Madison (1881), 75 Ind.
241; see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924), 34 Yale L. Jrl. 129, 229 for
discussion of'the unsoundness of these distinctions.
5 Knightstown v. Homer (1905), 36 Ind. App. 139.
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of its inhabitants from fire,6 in providing medical attention for the poor,7 in
providing jails and keeping them clean and inhabitable, 8 in providing a police
force for protection, 9 and in maintaining hospitals1 0 and other public build-
ings'1 in safe and proper condition, liability of the municipality for negli-
gence in the performance of any one of these duties is quite uniformly
denied. It is true that care of the poor, maintenance of jails and hospitals
and less often some of the other duties listed here are sometimes performed
by the county, which has a greater immunity from tort liability than a town
or city, but this distinction is not made.
Passing and enforcing ordinances. It is upon the theory of sovereignty
that the municipality is held immune from liability for failure to enforce an
ordinance prohibiting coasting,12 riding of bicycles,' 3 or horse racing 14 on
the public streets; nor is it liable for failure to enact a proper ordinance
prohibiting driving of vehicles for hire without a license, 15 or failure to
enact ordinances regulating the speed of railroad engines running along
certain public streets. 16 In the case of Wheeler v. City of Plymouth, 17 where
an ordinance forbade firing of explosives except upon license by the mayor,
and the plaintiff's buildings were damaged as a result of the exercise of such
a license, recovery was denied on the theory that the city was not liable for
failure to enact and enforce proper ordinances; nor was it liable for acts of
its licensees unless the act was inherently dangerous. However, in the case
of Moore v. City of Bloomington,' 8 where the municipality had the same
sort of ordinance, recovery was permitted when a small girl who was stand-
ing in the street watching a July Fourth celebration, was injured upon being
struck by a rocket. In the latter case an attempt was made to distinguish
Wheeler v. City of Plymouth' 9 upon the ground that in that case the license
to fire explosives was to be exercised in a vacant lot adjoining a public
street, while in the principal case it was contemplated that the license would
be exercised in the public streets and was therefore inherently dangerous
and a nuisance, also that the city was violating its duty to keep the streets in
6 Robinson v. Evansville (1882), 87 Ind. 334; DePauw v. New Albany Water Works
(1923), 193 Ind. 368; Larimore v. Indianapolis (1926), 197 Ind. 457; Union Traction
Co. v. Muncie (1923), 80 Ind. App. 260; Fitch v. Seymour Water Co. (1894), 139 Ind.
214; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville (1867), 29 Ind. 187; Louisville Traction Co. v. Jennings
(1919), 73 Ind. App. 69.
7 Summers v. Daviess County (1885), 103 Ind. 262; Williams v. Indianapolis (1900),
26 Ind. App. 628.
8 White v. Sullivan County (1891), 129 Ind. 396; Morris v. Switzerland County
(1892), 131 Ind. 285; Pritchett v. Knox County (1908), 42 Ind. App. 3; Greene County
v. Boswell (1891), 4 Ind. App. 133.
9 Smith v. Gary (1931), 93 Ind. App. 675; Lafayette v. Timberlake (1882), 88 Ind.
330; Vaughtman v. Waterloo (1895), 14 Ind. App. 649; Laurel v. Blue (1890), 1 Ind.
App. 281.
10 Scott v. Indianapolis (1920), 75 Ind. App. 387; Williams v. Indianapolis (1900),
26 Ind. App. 628.
11Vigo County v. Dailey (1892), 132 Ind. 73; McDermott v. Delaware County
(1915), 60 Ind. App. 209; Smith v. Allen County (1891), 131 Ind. 116.
12 Faulkner v. Aurora (1882), 85 Ind. 130; Lafayette v. Timberlake (1882), 88 Ind.
330.
's Millett v. Princetown (1906), 167 Ind. 582; Knouff v. Logansport (1900), 26 Ind.
App. 202; Logansport v. Kihm (1902), 159 Ind. 68.
14 City of North Vernon v. Aldridge (1920), 74 Ind. App. 309.
15 Vaughtman v. Town of Waterloo (1895), 14 Ind. App. 649.
16 Kistner v. Indianapolis (1884), 100 Ind. 210. See also Mayne v. Curtis (1920),
73 Ind. App. 640, holding that city is not liable for failure to require R. R. to install
bumper blocks.
17 (1888), 116 Ind. 158.
'8 (1912), 51 Ind. App. 145.
19 (1888), 116 Ind. 158.
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a safe condition. This distinction is somewhat inconclusive, since it can
hardly be said that it is more dangerous to fire explosives in the street than
to fire them from a vacant lot across the street. The only real difference in
the two cases seems to be that in the Wheeler case the damage was to prop-
erty abutting the street, which the city is under no duty to protect, while in
the Moore case the injury was to a traveler in the streets to whom the city is
under the obligation of keeping the streets reasonably safe.
Nuisances. The power of a municipality to prevent, remove, or abate
nuisances20 is generally held to be governmental so that the municipality is
not liable with respect thereto, but an exception to this rule is apparent where
the nuisance is one which makes the public streets unsafe.21
Where the municipality creates a nuisance it is guilty of tort and is liable
in damages, even though the nuisance is created in the performance of a
governmental duty. 22 Thus, the municipality has been held liable for creat-
ing nuisances in the following manner: Maintaining a pest house in such
close proximity to dwelling houses that the latter were rendered unsafe and
unpleasant,2 3 collecting garbage and rubbish and dumping it near dwelling
houses,2 4 dumping garbage where it would wash into streams and thereby
render them unfit for use, 25 and depositing garbage above a point where
plaintiff maintained docks, causing the harbor to fill up and be unapproach-
able.2 6 In the case of City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt27 the city was held liable
for maintaining a nuisance by disposing of the city sewerage in a stream
flowing through plaintiff's property and rendering such property unfit for
use. The later decision of City of Richmond v. Test 28 denies liability under
the same circumstances on the ground that this was the best modern method
of disposing of sewerage and that the city was guilty of no wrong. The
previous case is distinguished by saying that the discharge of sewerage into
the stream was "wrongful" in that instance. Just why such a method was
considered "wrongful" in one case and legal in the other is not made clear by
the court. City of Valparaiso v. Hagen 29 follows the Richmond case, stating
that this was the only method of sewerage disposal available to the city and
that private interest must yield to public good. However, in a recent case, 30
judgment was rendered against the city of Frankfort under substantially the
same facts on the basis that there was no longer any necessity for polluting
streams in this manner since a sewerage disposal plant could be built and
maintained by the expenditure of a reasonable sum. It may be that the
varying results were justified in each case, but this illustrates the ineffective-
ness of any hard and fast distinction such as the courts have attempted to
make.
Pounds. Most states consider the maintenance of a public pound the
exercise of a public function in connection with which the city is not liable,3 1
20 Miller v. Valparaiso (1893), 10 Ind. App. 22; Anderson v. East (1888), 117 Ind
26.
21 Grove v. City of Fort Wayne (1874), 45 Ind. 429; see also Moore v. City of
Bloomington, note 18.
22 New Albany v. Slider (1899), 21 Ind. App. 392.
23 Haag v. Vanderburg County (1878), 60 Ind. 54; Anabel v. Montgomery County
(1904), 34 Ind. App. 72.
24 New Albany v. Slider (1899), 21 Ind. App. 392; New Albany v. Armstrong
(1899), 22 Ind. App. 15; Cannelton v. Bush (1909), 45 Ind. App. 638.
25 New Castle v. Harvey (1913), 54 Ind. App. 243.
20 Peck v. Michigan City (1897), 149 Ind. 670.
27 (1894), 12 Ind. App. 250.
28 (1897), 18 Ind. App. 482.
29 (1899), 153 Ind. 337.
30 Frankfort v. Slipher (1928), 88 Ind. App. 356.
31 43 Corpus Juris, p. 1174.
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but in the case of City of Greencastle v. Martin,32 where the plaintiff's horse
was injured because the pound fence was not high enough and due to the
negligence of the city employees in tying the horse, the court permitted
Tecovery, saying that municipal corporations are responsible to the same
extent and in the same manner as natural persons, for injuries caused by
the negligence or unskillfulness of their agents in the construction of works
for the benefit of cities or towns under their government. The case relies
.upon the earlier decisions of Ross v. City of Madison,3 3 which is not a tort
case, Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette,.34 which was a sewer construction case,
and Brinkmeyer v. Evansville,3 5 which stated the rule as dictum. While this
language has been repeated in a few later decisions3 6 it is apparent that the
application of such a broad rule would extend the liability of municipal cor-
porations much beyond that imposed at the present time. In the later deci-
sion of Schnurr v. Huntington County,3 7 which is not a pound case, this
language of the Greencastle case was in effect repudiated by refusing to hold
the county liable for a tort arising out of the construction of a public project.
Public Parks and Playgrounds. In determining whether there shall be a
public park or playground our courts have held that the municipality exer-
cises a governmental function for which it is not liable.3 8 However, in the
case of City of Indianapolis v. Baker3 9 it was stated that the municipality is
liable for misfeasance or negligence in maintaining and operating a public
playground and its equipment because in so doing it acts "ministerially."
Such a liability is contrary to the rule in most states40 and this decision is
particularly objectionable since the distinction usually made is between "gov-
ernmental" and "corporate" acts, or between "discretionary" and "ministe-
rial" acts. Nor was any such statement necessary in view of the fact that in
this case the municipality was found to have been acting properly.
In the case of Gibson v. City of Indianapolis4 l plaintiff's minor daughter
was drowned when the boat in which she was riding overturned, throwing
her into the water, where she was caught and held by barbed wire on the bed
of the stream. The accident occurred in a portion of White River adjoining
a public park where persons were invited to use the river for boating and
bathing. The jury found that reasonable care in policing the stream would
not have disclosed the wire and that the municipality was not negligent.
Assuming that the facts were found correctly, the court properly placed the
"non-liability of the corporation on the ground that it was guilty of no tort.
Sarber v. City of Indianapolis, 42 which arises out of practically identical
,facts, goes upon the same basis. In both these cases the courts refrained
from placing their decision upon any such theory as that adopted by the
-Baker case. 43
Defects, Obstructions and Excavations. Quite obviously the city is acting
for the benefit of the public in caring for its streets, but even in the absence
3 2 (1881), 74 Ind. 449.
3 1 Ind. 281 (1848).
34 (1866), 26 Ind. 17.
3 53 (1867), 29 Ind. 187.
36 Indianapolis v. Williams (1914), 58 Ind. App. 447; Greencastle v. Martin (1881),
74 Ind. 449.
37 (1898), 21 Ind. App. 188.
38 Indianapolis v. Baker (1919), 72 Ind. App. 323; Kokomo v. Loy (1916), 185 Ind.
18.
39 (1919), 72 Ind. App. 323.
40 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2nd ed.), vol. 6, p. 911.
41 (1918), 68 Ind. App. 89.
42 (1919), 72 Ind. App. 594; see also Caldwell v. Alley (1919), 70 Ind. App. 313.
43 Note 39.
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of a statute imposing the obligation of maintaining streets of the municipal-
ity, liability has been enjoined for injuries incurred by reason of negligent
failure to keep the streets in a reasonably safe condition, 44 and the duty
extends to crossings,45 gutters,4 6 public alleys, 47 culverts, 48 bridges,4 9 and
sidewalks,5 o as well as to the street proper. This is on the theory that the
duty arises by implication from the exclusive authority and control over
streets which is granted the municipality by the legislature,5 1 and liability
cannot be escaped on the ground that the municipality is acting in a govern-
mental capacity. 5 2 The duty is one which cannot be delegated so as to re-
lieve the municipality for injuries caused by failure to perform it, by enter-
ing into a contract whereby a third person assumes it 5 3 or by employing an
independent contractor to make repairs. 5 4 While the city is bound to use
active vigilance to discover and repair defects in the streets and sidewalks, 5 5
44 Grove v. Fort Wayne (1874), 45 Ind. App. 429; Indianapolis v. Slider (1911),
48 Ind. App. 38; Evansville v. Frazer (1900), 24 Ind. App. 629.
45 Glantz v. South Bend (1885), 106 Ind. 305 (defect here was crossing raised above
the sidewalk); Evansville v. Thacker (1891), 2 Ind. App. 370 (hole in wooden cross-
ing) ; Lyon v. Logansport (1893), 9 Ind. App. 21 (iron crossing worn slippery) ; Indi-
anapolis v. Mitchell (1901), 27 Ind. App. 589 (plank crossing raised above sidewalk);
Mishawaka v. Kirby (1903), 32 Ind. App. 233 (abrupt descent from temporary cross-
ing) ; Indianapolis v. Scott (1880), 72 Ind. 196 (decayed timber over gutter); Aurora
v. Bittner (1884), 100 Ind. 396 (loose boards) ; Lafayette v. West (1908), 43 Ind. App.
325 (flagstone crossing which was worn smooth) ; Dondono v. Indianapolis (1909), 44
Ind. App. 366 (slippery flagstone crossing).
46 Buscher v. Lafayette (1893), 8 Ind. App. 590 (loose brick in gutter); Indian-
apolis v. Schoening (1911), 48 Ind. App. 76 (gutter so constructed as to look like part
of street) ; Hammond v. Jahnke (1912), 178 Ind. 177 (hole in crossing).
47 Indianapolis v. Murphy (1883), 91 Ind. 382 (hole).
48 Indianapolis v. Lawyer (1871), 38 Ind. 348 (caved-in culvert); Stackhouse v.
Lafayette (1866), 26 Ind. 17 (defectively planned culvert) ; Elwood v. Addison (1900),
26 Ind. App. 28 (making culvert higher than stream so that water collected and P's
intestate was drowned) ; Elwood v. Laughlin (1902), 29 Ind. 667 (loose boards).
49 Logansport v. Justice (1881), 74 Ind. 378 (disrepair); Blair v. Fort Wayne
(1912), 51 Ind. App. 652 (disrepair) ; Indianapolis v. Marold (1900), 25 Ind. App. 428
(disrepair); Odon v. Dobbs (1900), 25 Ind. App. 522 (irregular length of boards of
bridge) ; Riest v. Goshen (1873), 42 Ind. 339 (loose boards); Goshen v. Myers (1889),
19 Ind. 196 (rotten planks) ; Wabash v. Carver (1891), 129 Ind. 552 (rotten timbers) ;
Williamsport v. Smith (1891), 2 Ind. App. 360 (narrow approach at edge of embank-
ment) ; Franklin v. Davenport (1903), 31 Ind. App. 648 (rotton timbers) ; Connersville
v. Snider (1903), 31 Ind. App. 218 (rotten timbers) ; Indianapolis v. Cauley (1904), 164
Ind. 304 (disrepair).
5O Huntington v. McClurg (1898), 22 Ind. App. 261 (rotten boards); Boswell v.
Wakley (1893), 7 Ind. App. 361 (rotten boards); Kentland v. Hagen (1896), 13 Ind.
App. 1; Williamsport v. Lisk (1898), 21 Ind. App. 414 (steep slope) ; Grubb v. Frank-
lin (1910), 175 Ind. 500. See note 63 for other cases where city has been held liable for
defective sidewalks.
51 Goshen v. Myers (1889), 119 Ind. 196; Grove v. Fort Wayne (1874), 45 Ind.
429; Centerville v. Woods (1877), 57 Ind. 192; Lowery v. Bloomington & Chicago R. R.
(1912), 52 Ind. App. 510; Williamsport v. Lisk (1898), 21 Ind. App. 414; Decatur v.
Stoop (1898), 21 Ind. App. 397; Worthington v. Morgan (1897), 17 Ind. App. 603;
Knightstown v. Musgrove (1888), 116 Ind. 121.
52 Lafayette v. Clark (1921), 76 Ind. App. 565; Hudson v. Terre Haute (1928), 88
Ind. App. 454, but see Jourdan v. Lagrange (1913), 55 Ind. App. 502, and Stackhouse v.
Lafayette (1866), 26 Ind. 17, indicating that a city acts in private capacity. Also see
New Albany v. McCullough (1890), 127 Ind. 500, holding that the city cannot escape
liability on the ground that it has no funds with which to make repairs.
53 Evansville v. Behme (1911), 49 Ind. App. 448; Indianapolis v. Stokes (1914),
182 Ind. 31.
54 Anderson v. Fleming (1903), 160 Ind. 597; Logansport v. Dick (1880), 70 Ind.
65; Evansville v. Senhen (1898), 151 Ind. 42; Indianapolis v. Marold (1900), 25 Ind.
App. 428; Evansville v. Pifer (1912), 51 Ind. App. 646.
55 Washington v. Small (1882), 86 Ind. 462;, Evansville v. Fraser (1899), 24 Ind.
App. 628.
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it is not an insurer of their safety,56 but is liable only "for failure to exercise
ordinary care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition ;57 nor is it liable
for latent defects which would not have been discovered by reasonable care,58
or for the disrepair of streets outside the city limits. 59
If rails or barriers are necessary to provide proper protection for trav-
elers against excavations and dangerous defects immediately adjoining the
highway the municipality charged with the duty of keeping the streets in a
safe condition is bound to provide them, and is liable in damages for injuries
received by reason of its failure to do so. 60 The duty also extends to keep-
ing the way free from overhanging objects which are dangerous. 0 1
Where the unsafe condition of the street or sidewalk is the result of an
obstruction or excavation placed there by the city, no notice is necessary to
complete its liability, 62 but where the condition is due to disrepair, 63 or
56Higbert v. City of Greencastle (1873), 43 Ind. App. 574; Monticello v. Kennard
(1893), 7 Ind. App. 135; Huntington v. Barton (1911), 48 Ind. App. 117; Muncie v.
Spence (1904), 33 Ind. App. 599; Worthington v. Morgan (1897), 17 Ind. App. 603.
57 Evansville v. Wilter (1882), 86 Ind. 415; Albany v. McCullough (1890), 127
Ind. 500; Indianapolis v. Cox (1912), 76 Ind. App. 174.
58 Bicher v. South Bend (1897), 20 Ind. App. 177.
59 Huntington v. Thomas (1927), 80 Ind. App. 476, 86 Ind. App. 401.
60 Spencer v. Mayfield (1908), 43 Ind. App. 134; Hamm6nd v. Winslow (1903), 33
Ind. App. 92 (sidewalk built 4 ft. above adjoining lots) ; Indianapolis v. Schoenig (1911),
48 Ind. App. 76 (deep gutter at side of walk) ; Franklin v. Harter (1890), 127 Ind. 446
(cellarway at edge of walk) ; Stevens v. Logansport (1881), 76 Ind. 498 (ditch at edge
of walk) ; Wabash v. Bruso (1917), 186 Ind. 637 (stone quarry at side of road) ; Vin-
cennes v. Spees (1904), 35 Ind. App. 389 (large stone at edge of walk); Indianapolis
v. Moss (1920), 74 Ind. App. 129 (canal at edge of road) ; New Albany v. McCullough
(1890), 127 Ind. 500 (embankment); New Castle v. Grubbs (1908), 171 Ind. 482
(excavation adjoining walk); Knouff v. Logansport (1900), 26 Ind. App. 202 (embank-
ment at edge of walk) ; Sellersburg v. Ford (1906), 39 Ind. App. 94 (7-in. rise of side-
walk); Jeffersonville v. McHenry (1898), 22 Ind. App. 10 (cellar of mill which had
burned adjoining walk) ; Monticello v. Condo (1910), 47 Ind. App. 490 (embankment at
edge of road) ; Aurora v. Colshire (1876), 55 Ind. 484 (embankment); Higert v. Green-
castle (1873), 43 Ind. 574 (abrupt descent of walk); Huntington v. Lusch (1904), 33
Ind. App. 476; Elwood v. Addison (1901), 26 Ind. App. 28 (pool at edge of sidewalk) ;
Delphi v. Lowery (1881), 74 Ind. 520 (canal adjoining walk); Portland v. Taylor
(1890), 125 Ind. 522 (ditch adjoining walk).
01 Grove v. Ft. Wayne (1874), 45 Ind. 429; Indianapolis v. Slider (1911), 48 Ind.
App. 38; rehearing reported in 56 Ind. App. 200.
62 Lafayette v. Clark (1921), 76 Ind. App. 565; Goshen v. Alford (1899), 154 Ind.
58 (hole left by removing hitching post) ; Fowler v. Linquist (1894), 188 Ind. 438 (row
of wooden blocks for crossing); Alexandria v. Liebler (1903), 162 Ind. 438 (row of
wooden crossing blocks) ; Kokomo v. Boring (1899), 24 Ind. App. 552 (scales in road) ;
Titus v. Bloomfield (1923), 80 Ind. App. 483 (concrete post); Sellersburg v. Ford
(1906), 39 Ind. App. 94 (7-in. rise of sidewalk) ; Columbus v. Goodnow (1929), 91 Ind.
App. 6 (sand pile in street); Hudson v. Terre Haute (1928), 88 Ind. App. 454
(safety zone marker in street) ; Muncie v. Spence (1904), 33 Ind. App. 599 (steep grade
of sidewalk) ; Knightstown v. Musgrove (1888), 116 Ind. 121 (gravel pile in street);
Dondono v. Indianapolis (1909), 44 Ind. App. 366 (raised flagstone); Mitchell v. Tell
City (1907), 41 Ind. App. 294 (trench) ; Turner v. Indianapolis (1884), 96 Ind. 52;
contra; Bluffton v. Mathews (1883), 92 Ind. App. 213 (trench) ; Valparaiso v. Chester
(1911), 176 Ind. 636 (flagstone raised 8 in.); Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108
Ind. 530 (excavation by city at side of road); Lafayette v. Weaver (1883), 92 Ind.
477 (offset in sidewalk); Fort Wayne v. Durnell (1895), 13 Ind. App. 669 (steep
slope).
63 Fort Wayne v. Patterson (1891), 3 Ind. App. 34 (washout); Indianapolis v.
Cartlet (1923), 194 Ind. 273 (iron pole); Rushville v. Poe (1882), 85 Ind. 83 (hole
left in street while grading) ; Evansville v. Thacker (1891), 2 Ind. App. 370 (hole in
wooden walk); Terre Haute v. Landa (1914), 58 Ind. App. 480 (hole in wooden walk) ;
Columbus v. Strassner (1890), 124 Ind. 482; Princetown v. Gutheridge (1917), 66 Ind.
App. 602 (hole in pavement) ; Princetown v. Fields (1919), 72 Ind. App. 278 (hole in
pavement) ; Jacksonville v. Griggs (1924), 82 Ind. App. 104 (hole in street) ; Logans-
port v. Stevens (1881), 76 Ind. 498 (excavation); Terre Haute v. Constance (1900),
26 Ind. App. 421 (loose bricks) ; Madison v. Baker (1885), 103 Ind. 4 (washout) ; New
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where the obstruction or excavation is one made by a third person 4 the city
is not liable in the absence of notice, either actual or constructive, and the
passing of a reasonable time in which to have made the repairs. 65 What
length of time is -sufficient to charge the city with constructive notice is usu-
ally a question of fact for the jury.66 Thus, 2 days, 7 4 days, 68 10 days, 69
3 months, 70 , etc.,71 have been held to be sufficient. Actual notice to the
Castle v. Mullen (1909), 43 Ind. App. 280 (hole in sidewalk) ; Bloomington v. Wood-
worth (1907), 40 Ind. App. 373 (hole in sidewalk); Evansville v. Frazer (1899), 24
Ind. App. 628 (hole in wooden walk); Columbia City v. Langhor (1898), 20 Ind. App.
395 (hole in wooden walk) ; New Albany v. Stallings (1919), 71 Ind. App. 289 (loose
brick in walk) ; New Albany v. Kiefer (1919), 70 Ind. App. 289 (loose brick); Home
Brewing Co. v. Indianapolis (1919), 70 Ind. App. 674 (depression in sidewalk); Tipton
v. Freeman (1909), 45 Ind. App. 76 (slippery limestone walk) ; Fort Wayne v. Durnell(1895), 13 Ind. App. 669 (slope of walk); Goshen v. England (1889), 119 Ind. 368
(hole in walk); Bluffton v. McAfee (1899), 23 Ind. App. 112 (hole in sidewalk);
Valparaiso v. Schwerdt (1907), 40 Ind. App. 608 (loose bricks); Indianapolis v. Mul-
lally (1906), 38 Ind. App. 125 (hole in street) ; Bloomington v. C. I. & L. Ry. (1912),
52 Ind. App. 510 (hole in wooden walk) ; Huntington v. McClurg (1898), 22 Ind. App.
261 (rotten wooden walk) ; Nappanee v. Ruckman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 361 (loose board
in walk) ; Kentland v. Hagen (1896), 17 Ind. App. 1; East Chicago v. Gilbert (1915),
59 Ind. App. 613 (hole in sidewalk); Lafayette v. Larson (1881), 73 Ind. 367 (rotten
wooden walk) ; Washington v. Small (1882), 86 Ind. 462 (rotten wooden walk); Mich-
igan City v. Phillips (1904), 163 Ind. 449 (hole in wooden walk) ; Huntington v. Burke
(1894), 12 Ind. App. 133 (hole in wooden walk) ; Bauer v. City of Indianapolis (1884),
99 Ind. 56 (defective plank crossing) ; French Lick v. Allen (1916), 63 Ind. App. 649(hole in street) ; Franklin v. Smith (1910), 175 Ind. 236 (raised flagstone) ; Chicago v.
Gilbert (1915), 59 Ind. App. 613 (rotten wooden walk) ; Murphy v. Indianapolis (1883),
91 Ind. 382 (washout) ; Huntington v. First (1898), 22 Ind. App. 66 (loose planks).
64 Indianapolis v. Cartlet (1923), 194 Ind. 273 (iron pole); Vincennes v. Thuis
(1902), 28 Ind. App. 523 (ridge left when water main was laid) ; Wick-wire v. Angola
(1891), 4 Ind. App. 253 (excavation); Huntington v. McClurg (1898), 86 Ind. 414
(stone on walk) ; Black v. Mishawaka (1902), 30 Ind. App. 104 (lumber) ; Elkhart v.
Ritter (1879), 66 Ind. 136; Jeffersonville v. McHenry (1898), 22 Ind. App. 110 (cellar) ;
Indianapolis v. Gaston (1877), 58 Ind. 224 (stump); Monticello v. Kennard (1893), 7
Ind. App. 135 (brush pile) ; Indianapolis v. Doherty (1880), 71 Ind. 5 (building mate-
rials); Michigan City v. Boeckling (1889), 22 Ind. App. 39 (iron rails); Laporte v.
Henry (1907), 41 Ind. App. 197 (building materials); Laporte v. Osborn (1908), 43
Ind. App. 100 (building materials) ; Lewisville v. Batson (1901), 29 Ind. App. 21 (scrap
iron) ; Huntington v. Breen (1881), 77 Ind. 29 (excavation); Fort Wayne v. Dewitt(1874), 47 Ind. 39 (excavation); Greenfield v. Roback (1909), 45 Ind. App. 70 (tim-
ber); Lafayette v. Ashby (1895), 8 Ind. App. 214 (guy wire); Alexandria v. Liebler(1903), 162 Ind. 438 (163 Ind. 438 (blocks) ; Terre Haute v. O'Neal (1918), 72 Ind.
App. 485 (coal hole) ; Frankfort v. Coleman (1897), 112 Ind. 576 (hole) ; Warsaw v.
Dunlap (1887), 112 Ind. 57 (runway for bricks) ; Rosedale v. Ferguson (1891), 3 Ind.
App. 596 (rolls of wire); Bauer v. City of Indianapolis (1884), 99 Ind. 56 (planks);
Anderson v. Reed (1927), 87 Ind. App. 379 (iron pipes) ; Lafayette v. Blood (1872),
63 Ind. 62 (hole); Peoples v. Valparaiso (1912), 178 Ind. 673; Sipe v. Kokomo (1920),
74 Ind. App. 365 (cement step); Fort Wayne v. Durnell (1895), 13 Ind. App. 669
(tree trunk).
00 Huntington v. Burke (1898), 21 Ind. App. 655; Lewisville v. Batson (1901), 29
Ind. App. 21; Huntington v. Breen (1881), 77 Ind. 29; Huntington v. Sturver (1907),
41 Ind. App. 171; Lafayette v. Ashby (1893), 8 Ind. App. 214; Monticello v. Kennard(1893), 7 Ind. App. 135; Michigan City v. Boeckling (1889), 178 Ind. 177.
O Fort Wayne v. Paterson (1891), 3 Ind. App. 34; Hammond v. Jahnke (1912),
178 Ind. 177; Huntington v. Sturver (1907), 41 Ind. App. 171.
07 Monticello v. Kennard (1893), 7 Ind. App. 135.
08 Fort Wayne v. Duryee (1893), 9 Ind. App. 620.
69 Rushville v. Poe (1882), 85 Ind. 83.
70 Princetown v. Gutheridge (1917), 66 Ind. App. 602.
71 Indianapolis v. Mullally (1906), 38 Ind. App. 124 (6 weeks); Hammond v. Wins-
low (1903), 33 Ind. App. 92 (2 yrs.) ; Frankfort v. Coleman (1897), 19 Ind. App. 368
(60 days) ; New Castle v. Grubbs (1908), 171 Ind. 482 (several days) ; Greenfield v.
Roback (1909), 45 Ind. App. 70 (6 mos.); Tipton v. Freeman (1909), 45 Ind. App. 76(2 yrs.) ; Lafayette v. Larson (1881), 73 Ind. 367 (6 mos.) ; Aurora v. Bitner (1893),
8 Ind. App. 214 (1 day) ; Warsaw v. Dunlap (1887), 112 Ind. 376 (134 hrs. held insuf-
ficient).
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mayor,72 to any councilman, 73 or to any street commissioner, 74 is considered
actual notice to the city.
If the obstruction is one which may reasonably be expected to frighten
ordinarily gentle horses, the city is liable even though the person or property
injured does not come in actual contact with the defect, obstruction, or exca-
vation, but is injured due to-the fright of the horse. 75
The city is not liable for injuries arising from a general slippery condition
of a sidewalk resulting from an accumulation of ice or snow through natural
qauses,7 6 but liability may exist where the ice or snow becomes so rough as
to be an obstruction to travel, 77 or where water is allowed to drain into de-
fective places in the sidewalk by a leaky hydrant,79 or a waterspout s° placed
nearby and which has remained there for such a length of time that the city
has notice that damage may result.
Posts placed on the street for the purpose of hitching horses, or for other
lawful purposes, are not obstructions which will render the municipality
liable for injuries sustained thereby, if they are properly constructed and
located,8 ' nor is the city liable where it has granted permission to a third
person to place temporary obstructions in the street if such obstructions are
in fact properly guarded.82 It has also been held proper for the municipality
to maintain grass plots and tree spaces between the sidewalk and curb and
to protect them by suitable barriers.8 3 It is obvious that liability is denied
here simply because the city is acting properly in each instance and is guilty
of no tort.
If the person injured by the failure of the municipality to keep its streets
in a reasonably safe condition is guilty of contributory negligence he cannot
recover,8 4 but according to the modern rule,8 5 the mere fact that he knew
of the danger does not render him guilty of negligence in using the street.8 6
72 Michigan City v. Ballance (1889), 123 Ind. 334.
77 Logansport v. Justice (1881), 74 Ind. 378; Hammond v. Jahnke (1912), 178 Ind.
177.
74 Valparaiso v. Chester (1901), 176 bnd. 636; Lafayette v. Larson (1881), 73 ind.367; but notice to a fireman held not to be notice to the city in the case of Indianapolis
v. Ray (1912), 52 Ind. App. 388.
75 Rushville v. Adams (1886), 107 Ind. 475; Logansport v. Dick (1880), 70 Ind. 65;
Bloomington v. Rogers (1882), 83 Ind. 261; Salem v. Walker (1896), 16 Ind. App. 687;
Huntington v. Lusch (1904), 33 Ind. App. 476; Crown Point v. Thompson (1903), 31
Ind. App. 195; Royal Center v. Bingham (1905), 37 Ind. App. 626; Crawfordsville v.
Smith (1891), 79 Ind. 388; Fowler v. Linquist (1894), 138 Ind. 366; Mount Vernon v.
Hoehn (1898), 22 Ind. App. 282; Alexandria v. Liebler (1903), 162 Ind. 438.
76 McQueen v. Elkhart (1895), 14 Ind. App. 671; Linton v. Jones (1920), 75 Ind.
App. 320.
77 Linton v. Jones (1920), 75 Ind. App. 320; Valparaiso v. Kenney (1921), 75 Ind.
App. 660.
78 Linton v. Mattox (1920), 75 Ind. App. 449.
79 Diffenderfer v. Jeffersonville (1917), 67 Ind. App. 10.
80 Muncie v. Hey (1904), 164 Ind. 570.
81 Weinstein v. Terre Haute (1896), 147 Ind. 556.
82 Dooley v. Sullivan (1887), 112 Id. 451; South Bend v. Turner (1900), 158 Id.
418; Warsaw v. Dunlap (1887), 112 Ind. 576; Plymouth v. Fields (1890), 125 Ind. 323;
LaPorte v. Henry (1907), 41 Ind. App. 197; LaPorte v. Osborn (1908), 43 Ind. App.
100.
83 Teague v. Bloomington (1906), 40 Ind. App. 68.
84 Richmond v. Mulholland (1888), 116 Ind. 158; Salem v. Walker (1896), 16 Ind.
App. 687.
85 The earlier rule seems to have been contra: See North Vernon v. Dousouchette
(1851), 2 Ind. 586; Brunker v. Covington (1879), 69 Ind. 33; Bloomington v. Rogers
(1893), 13 Ind. App. 121; Trout v. Elkhart (1894), 12 Ind. 343.
so Ft. Wayne v. Breese (1889), 123 Ind. 581; Richmond v. Mulholland (1888), 116
Ind. 158; Columbus v. Strassner (1890), 124 Ind. 482; Poseyville v. Lewis (1890), 126
hid. 81; Itdianapolis v. Cook C1884), 99 Ind. 10; Huntington V. Breen (1881), 77 Ind.
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He is merely required to use care commensurate with the known danger,87
and whether he does use such care is a question for the jury.88 In order to
successfully maintain a suit against the municipality the plaintiff must also
prove that he has notified the city of the injury sustained as required by
statute,89 and that the negligence of the city was the proximate cause of his
injury.90
The foregoing rules are applicable only to cities and towns. In 1895 the
cases 0 ' holding that the statute imposing the obligation of maintaining cer-
tain bridges in the county impliedly made the county liable for negligence in
the performance of this duty were overruled,9 2 and the county now enjoys
the same immunity in this respect as does the state.9 3 This liability was
never imposed for failure of the county to perform its obligation to keep
its roads in repair.
Lighting Streets. The position of our courts regarding the lighting
of the streets by the municipality is an anomalous one. There are num-
erous cases holding that this is a governmental function and for failure
29; Murphy v. Indianapolis (1884), 83 Ind. 326; Albion v. Hetrick (1883), 90 Ind. 545;
Vance v. Franklin (1891), 4 Ind. App. 515; Bedford v. Neal (1895), 143 Ind. 425;
Gosport v. Evans (1887), 112 Ind. 133; Winamac v. Stout (1905), 165 Ind. 365; Bed-
ford v. Woody (1899), 23 Ind. App. 231; Elkhart v. Witman (1889), 122 Ind. 538;
Huntington v. Folk (1899), 154 Ind. 91; Lafayette v. West (1908), 43 Ind. App. 325;
Fort Wayne v. Farnan (1895), 13 Ind. App. 536.
87 Fowler v. Linquist (1894), 138 Ind. 566; Salem v. Walker (1896), 16 Ind. App.
687; Huntington v. First (1896), 15 Ind. App. 552; Evansville v. Christy (1901), 29 Ind.
App. 44; Hammond v. Winslow (1903), 33 Ind. App. 92; New Albany v. Stalling
(1919), 71 Ind. App. 232; Mooresville v. Spoon (1918), 69 Ind. App. 565.
88 New Castle v. Mullen (1908), 43 Ind. App. 280; New Albany v. Slattery (1919),
72 Ind. App. 503; Cochran v. Shirley (1908), 43 Ind. App. 453.
89 Touhey v. Decatur (1910), 175 Ind. 98; Huntingburg v. Hocker (1921), 76 Ind.
App. 435; Fort Wayne v. Bender (1914), 57 Ind. App. 689; Rushville v. Morrow
(1913), 54 Ind. App. 538; Valparaiso v. Kinney (1921), 75 Ind. App. 660; Gibben v.
Franklin (1919), 125 Ind. 500; People v. Valparaiso (1912), 178 Ind. 673; Blair v. Fort
Wayne (1912), 51 Ind. App. 652, holds that actual notice to the city is insufficient-must
comply with statute strictly; French Lick v. Allen (1916), 63 Ind. App. 649; Valparaiso
v. Cartwright (1893), 8 Ind. App. 429.
00 Plymouth v. Milner (1888), 117 Ind. 324; Vincennes v. Thuis (1901), 28 Ind.
App. 523; Crawfordsville v. Henry (1907), 41 Ind. App. 197; Fort Wayne v. Merri-
man (1909), 45 Ind. App. 286; Logansport v. Kihm (1902), 159 Ind. 68.
91 Park v. Adams County (1891), 3 Ind. App. 536; Madison County v. Brown
(1883), 89 Ind. 48; Vaught v. Johnson County (1884), 101 Ind. 121; Howard County
v. Legge (1886), 110 Ind. 479; Allen County v. Bacon (1884), 96 Ind. 31; Gibson
County v. Emmerson (1884), 95 Ind. 579; Abbett v. Johnson County (1884), 114 Ind.
61; House v. Montgomery County (1878), 60 Ind. 580; Patton v. Montgomery County
(1884), 96 Ind. 131; Pritchett v. Morgan County (1878), 62 Ind. 20; Woods v. Tipton
County (1890), 128 Ind. 289; Apple v. Marion County (1890), 127 Ind. 553; Knox
County v. Montgomery (1886), 109 Ind. 69; Allen County v. Creviston (1892), 133 Ind.
39; Shelby County v. Deprez (1882), 87 Ind. 509; Huntington County v. Bonebrake
(1896), 146 Ind. 311; Huntington County v. Huffman (1892), 134 Ind. 1; Fulton County
v. Richel (1885), 106 Ind. 501; Jackson County v. Nichlos (1894), 139 Ind. 611; Posey
County v. Stock (1894), 11 Ind. App. 167; Vermillion County v. Chipps (1891), 131
Ind. 611; Parke County v. Wagner (1894), 138 Ind. 609; Sullivan County v. Arnett
(1888), 116 Ind. 438; Sullivan County v. Sisson (1891), 2 Ind. App. 312; Shelby County
v. Castetter (1893), 7 Ind. App. 309; Wabash County v. Pearson (1889), 120 Ind. 428;
Parke County v. Sappenfield (1892), 6 Ind. App. 577; Shelby County v. Blair (1893),
8 Ind. App. 574.
92 Board of Jasper County v. Allman (1895), 42 Ind. 573; see also Yeager v.
Tippecanoe Township (1881), 81 Ind. 46, denying liability of township for failure to
repair bridge.
03 Johnson County v. Hemphill (1895), 14 Ind. App. 219; Montgomery County v.
Coffenbury (1895), 14 Ind. App. 701.
94 Abbett v. Johnson County (1894), 137 Ind. 404; Carroll County v. Bailey (1887),
122 Ind. 46; Clark County v. Brod (1891), 3 Ind. App. 585; Shrum v. Washington
County (1895), 13 Ind. App. 585.
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to exercise such power the municipality is not liable.9 5  Other cases9"
reach the same result, but do so on the ground that it is a "discretion-
ary" act which the municipality has no duty to perform. However,
where a light would have disclosed an obstruction or defect in the street
so that injury therefrom might have been avoided and no such light
was maintained, the municipality is held liable on the theory that
there was a breach of its duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe
condition. 97 In effect this is imposing liability for failure to light the streets.
Recovery is also permitted where injury has been sustained due to the failure
of the municipal corporation to maintain the electric light wires in a safe and
proper conditions. 98 In Aiken v. City of Columbus 99 the court said that while
the lighting of streets incidentally checked crime and immorality and thus
served a governmental purpose, such lighting was also a corporate utility,
sufficient to make municipal corporations liable for negligence. The court
fails to point out in what way the lighting of streets may be said to be a
corporate utility, and in view of the fact that the municipality receives no
monetary gain from performing this function, the declaration is somewhat
difficult to sustain.
Acts of Licensees Which Make The Streets Dangerous. The ques-
tion of the liability of the municipality for the negligent acts of its
licensees frequently, but not always, arises in connection with its duty
of keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition. The usual rule and the
rule of this state is that the municipality is not liable for injuries resulting
from the negligence of a licensee unless the act authorized is intrinsically
dangerous, 10 0 and this rule applies even though an ordinance makes the act
improper unless authorized by some designated official.1 0'
Constructing, Grading and Improving Streets. Where the city takes
possession of land and permanently appropriates it for a street without
complying with statutory requirements, it is liable as a tort feasor and dam-
ages are assessed against it on the basis of its value.
102
Grading and improving streets is a public function which the city may
perform or not as it sees fit, but having once determined to do so it is liable
for negligence in the plan' 0 3 or construction' 04 of such undertaking. How-
ever, for a consequential injury resulting from the original proper improve-
ment or grading of a street the city is not liable, 10 5 although it may be sub-
ject to an action of trespass if its servants wrongfully enter upon private
95 Bloomington v. C. I. & L. Ry. Co. (1912), 52 Ind. App. 510; Vincennes v. Spees
(1904), 35 Ind. App. 389; Vincennes v. Thuis (1902), 28 Ind. App. 523.
96 Spencer v. Mayfield (1908), 43 Ind. App. 134.
97 Shreve v. Ft. Wayne (1911), 176 Ind. 347; Titus v. Bloomfield (1923), 80 Ind.
App. 483; Hobart v. Casbon (1923), 81 Ind. App. 24.
98 Logansport v. Smith (1910), 47 Ind. App. 64; Richmond v. Lincoln (1906), 167
Ind. 468.
99 (1906), 167 Ind. 139.
100 Mayne v. Curtis (1920), 73 Ind. App. 640.
101 Wheeler v. Plymouth (1888), 116 Ind. 158.
102 Fort Wayne v. Hamilton (1892), 132 Ind. 487.
103 Valparaiso v. Adams (1889), 123 Ind. 25; Seymour v. Cummins (1889), 119
Ind. 148.
104 Princ6town v. Gieske (1883), 93 Ind. 102; North Vernon v. Voegler (1883),
103 Ind. 314; Jeffersonville v. Myers (1891), 2 Ind. App. 532.
105 Davis v. Crawfordsville (1888), 119 Ind. 1; Valparaiso v. Spaeth (1906), 166
Ind. 14; Vincennes v. Richards (1864), 23 Ind. 381; Morris v. Indianapolis (1911), 177
Ind. 369; Snyder v. Rockport (1855), 6 Ind. 237; Macy v. Indianapolis (1861), 17 Ind.
237; Kokomo v. Maham (1884), 100 Ind. 242; Valparaiso v. Adams (1889), 123 Ind. 25;
Anderson v. Bain (1889), 120 Ind. 254; Stein v. Lafayette (1892), 6 Ind. App. 414;
Hirth v. Indianapolis (1897), 18 Ind. App. 673; Terre Haute v. Turner (1871), 36 Ind.
522.
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property while engaged in carrying out this work. 10 6 This immunity from
liability for consequential injuries has been limited by a statute' 0 7 providing
that after the grade is once established an abutting property owner may re-
cover for the consequential injury to his property even though such injury
was not the result of negligence.' 0 8 This statutory liability extends only to
cities, however, and does not apply to towns' 09 even if the grade is changed
after the town becomes a city. 11
The city is not permitted to cut down the grade of a street merely for
the purpose of obtaining dirt for another street,"' but where the council has
ordered the improvement of different streets the earth, gravel and stone ex-
cavated from one street may be used on another."i 2
Drains and Sewers. As a part of its control over the streets, the
municipality has the power to construct drains and sewers, and it is
well settled in this state that this power is a discretionary one of
public character so that it is not liable for failure to exercise it,i i 3 un-
less the sewers and drains are made necessary by the municipality's
own act of grading the streets in such a manner that water is col-
lected where it will flow upon private property in the absence of a
proper sewer or drain."i 4 When the city once undertakes the work, how-
ever, it is liable for negligence in so doing, 115 and contrary to the law of
most states," 6 is liable for negligence in the plan as well as in the prosecu-
tion of the work."i 7  In a few cases" s the courts have stated that the cor-
poration would not be liable for a mere error of judgment as distinguished
from negligence in the plan, but this distinction would seem to be of little
practical value. The city is also required to use reasonable care to keep
106 Platter v. Seymour (1882), 86 Ind. 323; Martinsville v. Shirley (1882), 84 Ind.
546.
107 Burns Ann. Statutes, 1926, sec. 10441.
108 Lafayette v. Nagel (1887), 113 Ind. 425; Lafayette v. Wortman (1886), 107
Ind. 404.
10) Baker v. Shoals (1892), 6 Ind. App. 319.
110 Wabash v. Albert (1882), 88 Ind. 428.
111 Delphi v. Evans (1917), 36 Ind. 90; Aurora v. Fox (1881), 78 Ind. 1.
112 Delphi v. Evans (1871), 36 Ind. 90.
113 Elkhart v. Wickwire (1889), 121 Ind. 331; Finley v. Kendallville (1909), 45 -
Ind. App. 430, holding that it may even be discontinued if property owners are left in
no worse position than before its construction; Colburn v. Bossert (1895), 13 Ind. App.
359; Monticello v. Fox (1891), 3 Ind. App. 481; Logansport v. Wright (1865), 25 Ind.
512.
114 Evansville v. Decker (1882), 84 Ind. 325; Princetown v. Gieske (1883), 93 Ind.
102; Wells v. Madison (1881), 75 Ind. 241; Davis v. Crawfordsville (1888), 119 Ind. 1;
Thortown v. Fugate (1898), 31 Ind. App. 537; Crawfordsville v. Bond (1884), 96 Ind.
236; Evansville v. Decker (1882), 84 Ind. 325; Weis v. Madison (1881), 75 Ind. 241;
New Albany v. Ray (1891), 3 Ind. App. 321; North Vernon v. Voegler (1883), 89 Ind.
77; Valparaiso v. Keys (1902), 30 Ind. App. 447; Cromer v. Logansport (1905), 38
Ind. App. 661; French Lick v. Teaford (1912), 78 Ind. App. 609.
115 Logansport v. Wright (1865), 25 Ind. 512; Indianapolis v. Williams (1914), 58
Ind. App. 447; Cummins v. Seymour (1881), 79 Ind. 491; Peru v. Brown (1894), 10
Ind. 597.
116 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2nd ed.), vol. 6, ch. 53, p. 794.
"17 Lebanon v. Twiford (1895), 13 Ind. App. 384; Garrett v. Winterich (1909), 44
Ind. App. 322; Evansville v. Decker (1882), 84 Ind. 325; Roll v. Indianapolis (1876),
52 Ind. 547, denying liability of the basis of a contract to hold immune from liability;
Indianapolis v. Lawyer (1871), 38 Ind. 348; Terre Haute v. Hudnut- (1887), 112 Ind.
542; Indianapolis v. Huffer (1868), 30 Ind. 235; Albany v. Lines (1898), 21 Ind. App.
380; New Albany v. Ray (1891), 3 Ind. App. 321; Weis v. City of Madison (1881), 75
Ind. 241; New Castle v. Smith (1927), 87 Ind. App. 418; Indianapolis v.-Tate (1872),
39 Ind. 282.
118 Rice v. Evansville (1886), 108 Ind. 7; Rozell v. Anderson (1883), 91 Ind. 591;
Lafayette v. Clark (1921), 76 Ind. App. 565.
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drains and sewers in a reasonable state of repair after they are constructed, 19
but here again the city is liable only after actual or constructive notice of the
defect.120 The city's obligation in this respect is the same toward one who
makes a private connection with the sewers as it is toward any other per-
son using them.
121
The municipality is said to be acting in its corporate or proprietary ca-
pacity in carrying on any function from which it derives a substantial reve-
nue. Responsibility for torts committed while acting in this capacity is lim-
ited only by the doctrine that a municipal corporation is never liable for acts
which are ultra vires.122 Inasmuch as the sole purpose of creating the
municipality is to make more efficient the government of the state and to
act for the benefit of the public it is incongruous, to say the least, to main-
tain that the municipality may carry on a private business and still act intra
vires. It may be that in a few instances the corporation does derive a reve-
nue in excess of the actual operating costs of some function properly per-
formed by it, but even so the profit is used solely for reducing the burdens
of government borne by the inhabitants of the unit. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction persists, and it is small wonder that the courts have, in their attempt
to follow the rule, been driven to such absurd classifications.
Water Companies Owned By the Municipality. As pointed out be-
fore, where a municipal corporation maintains a water plant for the
sole purpose of extinguished fire, such corporation is not liable for
its negligence therein, 2 13 but where it supplies citizens with water and
charges them therefor, the city acts in its "private" capacity and is liable for
its negligence in fulfilling the obligations assumed in respect to furnishing
such services.' 24 For instance, the municipality has been held liable in dam-
ages to one whose property was injured by the bursting of a defective water
main when extra pressure was added at the pumping station in order to ex-
tinguish a fire which broke out in the business district of the city.' 2 5 The
city has "also been held accountable to one who contracted typhoid fever from
drinking water which had been contaminated due to the negligent manner in
which the city maintained its reservoirs, 126 and to the owner of a greenhouse
whose property was injured when the supply was shut off. 12 7
Wharves. It is usually held 128 that the city is acting in its private capac-
ity while engaged in the management of wharves over which it has been given
control by the legislature. The Indiana courts have imposed liability upon the
municipality for failure to keep such wharves in repair,120 but apparently
119 Murphy v. Indianapolis (1901), 158 Ind. 238; Fort Wayne v. Coombs (1889),
123 Ind. 250; Logansport v. Newby (1911), 49 Ind. App. 674; Valparaiso v. Ramsey
(1894), 11 Ind. App. 215; South Bend v. Paxton (1879), 67 Ind. 228.
120 Ft. Wayne v. Coombs (1889), 123 Ind. 250; but see French Lick v. Teaford
(1921), 78 Ind. App. 609, holding notice unnecessary where sewer is rendered ineffective
by city's own negligence.
121 Ft. Wayne v. Coombs (1889), 123 Ind. 250.
122Leeds v. Richmond (1885), 103 Ind. 372; Shelby County v. Deprez (1882), 87
Ind. 509; Haag v. Vanderburg County (1878), 60 Ind. 511; Browning v. Owen County
(1873), 44 Ind. 11.
123 Fitch v. Seymour Water Co. (1894), 139 Ind. 214; Huntingburg v. Morgen
(1928), 90 Ind. App. 573; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville (1867), 29 Ind. 187.
124 Aschoff v. Evansville (1904), 34 Ind. App. 25; Sarber v. Indianapolis (1919),
72 Ind. App. 594.
125 Aschoff v. Evansville (1904), 34 Ind. App. 25.
126 Pa. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln Trust Co. (1929), 91 Ind. App. 28.
127 Huntingburg v. Morgen (1929), 90 Ind. App. 572.
.28 C. W. Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932), 19 Va. L.
Rev., p. 748.
129 Jeffersonville v. Gray (1905), 165 Ind. 26; Jeffersonville v. L. & L. Ferry Co.
(1866), 27 Ind. 100; Jeffersonville v. Steam Ferryboat Co. (1870), 35 Ind. 19.
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did not put their decisions on the ground that the municipality derived a
profit from performing this function. The reasons given are not very clear,
but it would seem that the decisions might very well go upon the same ground
as the street cases, namely, that the absolute duty to keep them in repair
cerates liability for failure io do so.
Independent Contractors. The general rule is that a municipal corpo-
ration is not responsible for the negligence of an independent con-
tractor, 30 but this rule has certain well recognized exceptions. It is
generally stated that the rule has no application where the work re-
quired to be done is inherently dangerous or where the necessary
consequence of doing the work as specified is injury to another, or
where it is unlawful or involves a trespass, or where the subject matter
of the contract involves a duty, the performance of which may not be dele-
gated.13 1 It is on the theory that the work of making repairs and improve-
ments to the public streets is inherently dangerous and that the duty to keep
the streets safe is one which cannot be delegated, that the municipality has
been held liable for negligence of independent contractors in performing this
work.' 32
Actions by Employees. In the few instances where the question
of suit against the municipality by an employee has arisen no very
definite rule governing recovery has been laid down. In City of Ko-
komo v. Loy' 3 3 the court stated that the liability of the municipal-
ity depended not on the relation existing between the municipality
and the person injured, but upon the capacity in which the municipal-
ity was acting at the time. After laying down the test, however, the court
permitted recovery by a park employee who was injured by the explosion of
a cannon which he was attempting to unload under the direction of the park
commissioner, saying that the statute which gave the city complete power
over its parks created a corresponding duty of the proper exercise of the
power. It is on this same basis that the municipality is held liable for failure
to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition.
In the case of City of Lebanon v. McCoy' 3 4 an employee was allowed
to recover for injuries sustained due to the negligence of a fellow employee
while both were employed in repairing a bridge. In this case the common
law rule that the master is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of a co-servant was apparently ignored, as was the earlier case of Turner v.
City of Indianapolis' 35 which expressly stated that this rule is not applicable
to municipal corporations. The doctrine of assumption of risks of the em-
ployment is held to be appropriate, but no such assumption was found to exist
in the cases just mentioned. Recovery was denied on this ground in Swan-
son v. City of Lafayette 36 where an employee of the city was injured by
the caving in of a gravel pit in which he was working, and Smith v. Commis-
sioners of Allen County,137 denied recovery under similar circumstances but
put the decision on the ground that the county is a subdivision of the state
and therefore not liable for negligence.
130 Leeds v. City of Richmond (1885), 102 Ind. 372; Staldter v. City of Hunting-
ton (1899), 152 Ind. 354; Kinser v. Dewitt (1893), 7 Ind. App. 587.
131 Julius Keller Construction Co. v. Herkless (1915), 59 Ind. App. 47.
132 Anderson v. Fleming (1902), 160 Ind. 597; Logansport v. Dick (1888), 70 Ind.
65; Indianapolis v. Marold (1900), 25 Ind. App. 428; Indianapolis v. Cox (1921), 76
Ind. App. 174; Evansville v. Piefer (1912), 51 Ind. App. 646; Evansville v. Behme
(1911), 49 Ind. App. 448.
'33 (1916), 185 Ind. 18.
134 (1894), 12 Ind. App. 500.
135 (1884), 96 Ind. 51.
136 (1895), 134 Ind. 623.
'37 (1891), 131 Ind. 116.
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Jourdan v. Town of Lagrange'8 8 holds that in prosecuting the work of
,paving a street the city is not performing a duty enjoined upon it as a sub-
division of the state, and hence it is not exempt from liability for injury to
its employees in the prosecution of the work.
The case of City of Lafayette v. Allen 8 9 permitted recovery by a city
fireman who was injured due to the defective condition of the fire engine,
and Lyons v. City of New Albany' 40 permitted recovery by the administra-
tor of a city fireman who was killed while repairing a fire alarm wire at the
direction of the fire chief. Whether the employee had assumed the risk
was held to be a question for the jury. In neither case did the court men-
tion the fact that the employees were engaged in carrying out duties inci-
dent to the performance of a governmental function.
From an examination of the cases in which the municipality was held
liable to employees, it is apparent that the tendency of the courts has been
to hold the municipality to a more stringent liability than that imposed upon
a private employer before the Workmen's Compensation Act. This is some-
what strange in view of the usual irresponsibility of municipalities.
Even a somewhat perfunctory examination of the cases discloses that
any value which the theory of dual capacity may once have had has long
since ceased to be of any assistance to the courts as a test for determining
whether the municipality shall be liable or immune. In recent years there has
been a tendency to try to solve the problem by statutory enactments.' 4 ' Per-
haps the most common type of statute which illustrates this trend is the act
imposing liability for damages resulting from mob violence. Such an enact-
ment is somewhat curious since in the ordinary situation where damage re-
sults from mob violence the municipality is not guilty of a wrong, unless
perhaps, there is a failure to properly police the city, and as already pointed
out, practically every jurisdiction denies liability for failure to perform this
function efficiently. For the most part such statutes have been fragmentary
and unsatisfactory. 142
Upon facing the problem squarely, it can readily be seen that in each in-
stance the liability or immunity of the municipal corporation is a matter of
public policy. On the one side is the interest of the taxpayers, who ulti-
mately bear the burden when the municipality is held liable, and the interest
of the state in having certain functions adequately carried out without inter-
ference. On the other side is the interest of the individual in freedom from
losses caused by the torts of the municipality. The increasing number of
functions performed by the government makes an equitable disposition of
the problem all the more important. Such a solution will be obtained only
when the courts cease to play Blind Man's Bluff with such antiquated doc-
trines as dual capdcity, and when they frankly recognize and acknowledge
that each case presents its own individual question, determinable only by a
consideration of the relative importance of the interests involved in each in-
stance. It is to be noted that in a large majority of the modern cases the
Indiana court seems to have reached the most desirable result, but whether
this was accidental or whether the court secretly recognized the problem
before it, is well obscured by the language of the courts.
138 (1913), 55 Ind. App. 502.
139 (1881), 81 Ind. 166; Valparaiso v. Chester (1911), 176 Ind. 636.
140 (1913), 54 Ind. App. 416.
141 C. W. Tooke, Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev., p. 748
(1932).
142 C. W. Tooke, Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev., p. 748
(1932).
